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How is it possible that a treaty that according to our Supreme
Court offers no recourse, no change in American law, no
access to American courts, how is it possible that such a treaty
could threaten anybody in our country? The answer is simple,
it doesn’t, and it can’t.
— Secretary of State, then Senator from Massachusetts, John Kerry.1
In short, there is no reason for our country to give up our
sovereignty to the United Nations when it comes to providing
benefits and protections for the disabled in America.
Furthermore, it would be an egregious move to deny parents of
children with disabilities the right to do what they think is in
their child’s best interest in exchange for some illegitimate
claim that disabled Americans will have better treatment
abroad. CRPD must be defeated.
— Former Sen. Rick Santorum2
I. INTRODUCTION
All eyes are watching as the United States contemplates ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This
Note first examines the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) by describing its purposes, functions, and goals. This
examination reveals that the importance of the CRPD cannot be downplayed;
for the 650 million disabled persons worldwide, the CRPD serves as a
hallmark of international progress towards the empowerment of all people
with disabilities.3
Notwithstanding its celebrated formation, however, the CRPD’s
functionality cued warning sirens for the United States when the Convention

1
Sunlen Miller, Bob Dole Can’t Sway Republicans to Back UN Disabilities Treaty, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/12/bob-dole-cantsway-republicans-to-back-un-disabilities-treaty/.
2
Rick Santorum, This Treaty Crushes U.S. Sovereignty, WND (Dec. 2, 2012, 8:43 PM),
http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/this-treaty-crushes-u-s-sovereignty/.
3
INCLUSION FOR ALL: THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
1 (Deborah A. Ziegler ed., 2010).
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was debated during the 112th Congress in 2012.4 This Note investigates the
reasons behind Congress’s hesitation in ratifying the Convention, and will do
so in the shadow of the United States’ strong stance on the rights of the
disabled, exemplified by current domestic policy.5
Although the United States is a leader in the push for disability rights on
an international stage, the CRPD creates possible national sovereignty
concerns for the U.S.—concerns, which, if left unaddressed, could threaten
the authority of U.S. law according to some U.S. policymakers.6 The
validity of these concerns about national sovereignty will be addressed
within this Note.
Additionally, this Note considers the fine balance between compliance
with desirable international treaties and the need to safeguard domestic
policy. One often utilized yet controversial method of balancing these
subject matters is the use of reservations, understandings, or declarations,
more commonly known as “RUDs.”7 The history behind RUD usage will be
surveyed, along with current attitudes towards these tools.
In light of these considerations, one question remains: Can and should the
United States submit a RUD to the CRPD? RUDs have explicit restraints
that must be adhered to by any nation utilizing them, including the limitation
that a RUD cannot be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty.8 This Note addresses whether the United States can successfully
make a reservation to the CRPD that serves to protect domestic policy while
remaining compatible with the CRPD’s object and purpose.
Once it is established that it would be a calculated, although advisable,
risk for the United States to submit a RUD, the analysis is not over. Just
because the United States is of the opinion that the RUD is permissible does
not mean that the rest of the world will vehemently agree; other nations may
view the RUD as “prohibited” and thus involve the United States in a
perilous debate over the RUD’s validity.9 This Note examines the likelihood
4
LUISA BLANCHFIELD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 7-5700, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION
DEBATE R42749, at 1–8 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42749.pdf.
5
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
DISABILITY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (CRPD) (2008), reprinted in INCLUSIONS FOR ALL, supra note
3, at 74–81.
6
Anderson Cooper, U.N. Treaty ‘Could have an Impact,’ AC360 BLOG (Dec. 7, 2012, 11:36
PM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/07/u-n-treaty-could-have-an-impact/?hpt=ac_bn1.
7
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 131–33 (2d ed. 2007) (defining
reservations and explaining their use in multilateral treaties).
8
Id. at 134–38.
9
Id. at 138–39.
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of this occurring, and answers the provocative question of whether foreign
policy dangers outweigh any foreign policy benefits that would result from
submitting a reservation to the CRPD.
Decisively, the current state of the international stage suggests that
utilizing a reservation for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities is well worth the risk. Neither national sovereignty concerns nor
potential international backlash to a RUD dwarf the need for ratification of
the Convention.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CRPD
The brainchild of disability advocates who worked for decades towards
the development of a disability convention, the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities formally began on December 19, 2001.10 General
Assembly resolution 56/168, passed in December of 2001, created an Ad
Hoc Committee tasked with considering “proposals for a comprehensive and
integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities, based on the holistic approach. . . .”11 As
the first binding international treaty of its kind, the initial stages of the CRPD
garnered the backing of governments, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and disability people’s organizations (DPOs) alike.12
The creation of this Ad Hoc Committee marked the start of the five-year
drafting process that ultimately crafted the CRPD.13 Over forty nations and
400 different DPOs and NGOs comprised the Ad Hoc Committee, signifying
a shift in global policy towards an attitude of respect for individuals with
disabilities.14
On December 13, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the CRPD.15 Then, on March 30, 2007, the Convention opened for
signatures,16 indicating the start of a long and multifarious road towards a
10
Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287, 288 (2007).
11
G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/229 (Dec. 18, 2002); see also Ad Hoc Committee
on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE available at http://www.
un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoccom.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Ad Hoc
Committee Report] (describing the Ad Hoc Committee’s eight sessions).
12
Kanter, supra note 10, at 288.
13
Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 11.
14
Kanter, supra note 10, at 289.
15
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRPD], available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml.
16
Id. art. 42.
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United States ratification decision.17 With eighty-two nations signing on its
inaugural day, the Convention had the highest number of first-day signatories
of any United Nations treaty in history.18 The CRPD had undoubtedly seized
the world’s attention, and its momentum would not drastically slow in the
weeks and years to come. Since opening for signature, there are now 147
ratifications and accessions to the Convention and 158 signatories to the
Convention, including the United States.19
The objectives and principles laid out in the adopted CRPD primarily
came about as a way to combat the abysmal reality of how people with
disabilities are disregarded on a global scale. Ten percent of the world’s
population is living with a disability, 80% of all persons with disabilities live
in developing countries, and 20% of the world’s poorest people are
disabled.20 Further, despite the aforementioned statistics, only forty-five
countries have any anti-discrimination or disability-specific laws.21 These
figures magnify the dire need for a global initiative that aims to level the
playing field for individuals living with disabilities. The CRPD was
developed to answer that resounding bell of disparity.
The Convention serves as a pioneering international accumulation of
ideas, complete with the overarching themes of “dignity of the individual;
access to justice; importance of family decision making; and access to
education, independent living, and employment.”22 The stated purpose of the
CRPD is to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and
to promote respect for their inherent dignity.”23 The Convention’s
predominant principles reflect that the global community has finally stepped
up to the plate with regards to the equality of persons with disabilities. As
international actors move towards recognizing meaningful inclusion, the
quality of life for these individuals is sure to rise.24 Furthermore, the
Convention’s stated purpose not only provides a helpful insight into the
17

BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4.
Kanter, supra note 10, at 288.
19
CRPD and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, U.N., http://www.un.org/dis
abilities/documents/maps/enablemap.jpg (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
20
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Facts about Persons with
Disabilities, U.N., http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/facts.shtml (last visited Sept. 7,
2014).
21
Id.
22
INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 2.
23
CRPD, supra note 15, art. 1.
24
INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing how global advocacy is one of the
most powerful ways to ensure that the rights of people with disabilities are “supported and
strengthened”).
18
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reasons behind the establishment of the treaty, but it also becomes
tremendously important when determining whether any reservations,
understandings, or declarations to the CRPD would be valid.25
Moving from ideology to functionality, the CRPD creates two
implementation tools that aim to enhance the Convention’s foundational
theories.26 These two mechanisms are the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (the Committee or Expert Committee) and the
Conference of States Parties (the Conference).27
The Committee is a body of experts that reviews individual states’
implementations of the Convention.28 The Committee examines each state’s
periodic reports to see what measures have been taken to further the goals of
the CRPD.29 It is important to note that after the Committee scrutinizes a
state’s period report, it will then return “such suggestions and general
recommendations on the report as it may consider appropriate.”30
Importantly, however, the recommendations given by the Committee are
advisory only; none of their decisions are binding upon states.31
This Committee’s oversight power is heightened if a state has signed onto
the CRPD Optional Protocol—a separate but related international treaty that
establishes two procedures “aimed at strengthening the implementation and
monitoring of the Convention.”32 The two procedures created by the
Optional Protocol are a petition process and an inquiry process.33 These
mechanisms provide the authority to receive complaints from individuals
whose rights have allegedly been breached in violation of the Convention,
and subsequently undertake inquiries into the content of those petitions.34
Essentially, the Protocol operates on the same foundation as the Convention,
but its signing dictates that nations can be held to a higher standard of
accountability than if the nation had solely signed or ratified the Convention
itself.35
25

AUST, supra note 7, at 136.
CRPD, supra note 15, arts. 34, 40.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. arts. 35–36.
30
Id. art. 36.
31
S. REP. NO. 112-6, at 5 (2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112erp
t6/html/CRPT-112erpt6.htm.
32
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Questions and Answers, U.N.
UNABLE (2008–2009), http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=23&pid=151, reprinted
in INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 54–73.
33
CRPD, supra note 15, arts. 34–39.
34
INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 55.
35
Id.
26
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The second implementation tool used by the Convention to enrich its
inclusion objectives is the Conference of States Parties.36 The Conference
meets regularly to discuss matters regarding implementation of the treaty
(i.e., debating proposed amendments, etc.).37 Although the specifics of the
Conference are left unaddressed by the CRPD’s textual language, its main
purpose is the creation of a forum for consideration of any implementation
matters.38
It is with these foundational ideas and implementing mechanisms in mind
that the CRPD has been presented to the potential ratifying countries.
Although the terms of the Convention seem straightforward, the Convention,
like most major multilateral treaties, is bursting with areas of potential
conflict and confusion. While many nations have confidently ratified the
Convention, many have refused to do so.39 Captivated by fears over national
sovereignty, some nations and their citizens simply do not think the CRPD’s
rewards outweigh its risks.40
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE CRPD: A HISTORY
In December 2012 the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the CRPD falling a
mere five votes short of the required super majority vote.41 The vote to not
ratify was due to a variety of concerns; most importantly, there was concern
whether the Convention could stretch its authority beyond the U.S.’s ratified
intent.42 The Senate was afraid that the Convention could one day interfere
with the functioning of the United States’ federalist system.43
Congress’s worries are best articulated as falling under the umbrella of
national sovereignty; the centerpiece of the United States’ anxiety toward the
Convention is derived from the belief that the treaty could supersede U.S.

36

Id. at 65.
Id.
38
CRPD, supra note 15, art. 40.
39
Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratification: Countries and Regional
Integration Organizations, U.N. ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=
17&pid=166 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
40
See BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1–8 (“In debates regarding U.S. ratification of
CRPD, the treaty’s possible impact on U.S. sovereignty has been a key area of concern.”);
Anderson Cooper, Farris: U.N. Treaty ‘Is a Law,’ AC360 BLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:55 AM),
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/11/farris-u-n-treaty-is-a-law/?iref=allsearch (discussing
how the treaty would give the U.N. power to control parents’ decisions for their children).
41
BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
42
Id. at 16–18.
43
Id.
37
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law and thus gain authority over U.S. domestic policy.44 A careful
examination of the United States’ historical dealings with the CRPD reveals
that the reluctances to ratify are not arbitrary or rare. Hesitations to ratify the
CRPD, emanating from the fear of diminishing national sovereignty, are
deeply entrenched within the minds of many U.S. policymakers.
A timeline of events exposes the reality that numerous United States
policymakers in differing branches of the federal government have expressed
apprehension over what the CRPD’s effects would be upon U.S.
government.45 Although the U.S. played a fundamental role in the creation
of the CRPD, there is a marked history of reluctance to adhere to its
standards.46 Whether the hesitation is derived from a President or Congress,
lawmakers have never been unified toward ratification of the CRPD.47
Specifically regarding the CRPD, the ratification process was interrupted
during the full Senate vote.48 Before that failing vote, however, several
important steps were taken. First, from 2002 to 2006, the Ad Hoc Committee
negotiated the Convention’s text.49 It is important to note that the U.S.
participated in every session during this four-year period,50 and, in 2006, the
Bush Administration openly favored other countries’ adoption of the General
Assembly resolution, while also noting that there would be no signing or
ratifying of the treaty by the United States because of national sovereignty
concerns.51
Several years and an administration change later, President Obama signed
the CRPD in July 2009, and in May 2012 it was transmitted to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification.52 By a vote of 13–6 the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the CRPD favorably to the full
Senate.53 Finally, in December 2012 by a vote of 61–38, the full Senate
voted against ratification of the CRPD.54 The initial battle was over, but the
debate certainly lacked a sense of closure.
This sequence of events leading up to the full Senate vote acted as a
roadblock to ratification of the Convention, but proponents of the
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 16.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Convention did not halt their campaign. The resilience of the pro-ratification
supporters, in addition to the importance of the underlying principles behind
the Convention, signifies the need to carefully dissect the ratification debate.
IV. THE UNITED STATES RATIFICATION DEBATE
Despite the obvious battle between those who support the CRPD and
those who oppose its ratification, the apprehensions associated with the
treaty are hard to pin down at first glance. In order to better understand the
debate, the arguments for and against ratification must be examined.
A. The Foundations of the Anti-Ratification Argument
First, there are extreme national sovereignty fears associated with the
ratification of the treaty. On the surface, the concerns associated with
ratifying the CRPD revolve around how U.S. laws would interact with the
provisions of the treaty—essentially, which sovereignty would win out?55
This argument jumps to the conclusion that ratifying the CRPD would make
the United States vulnerable to the policies of other nations (i.e., that the
European countries would interpret certain provisions to mean that disabled
children cannot be homeschooled, etc.).56
The true root of the apprehension is traced back to the uncertainty of the
Expert Committee’s power restraints in light of the United States
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.57 The Supremacy Clause states, “all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”58 The CRPD Expert
Committee serves as an implementation body with the purpose of
periodically examining state’s compliance.
Thus the scope of the
Committee’s power is the driving point behind the ratification debate.59
While treaty committees do not technically possess binding power, many
treaty committees are nevertheless viewed with hesitation.60 A powerful
treaty committee that operates in a parallel fashion to the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause has presented novel concerns in the last few decades. A
historical tendency towards the enhancement of power for treaty bodies
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 65.
BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.
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creates a foreboding question mark as to how the CRPD Committee would
operate.
There are currently nine human rights treaty bodies that serve to monitor
the core human rights treaties that the bodies are associated with.61 These
treaties include: Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), Human Rights Committee (CCPR), Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), Committee against Torture, Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), Committee on Migrant Workers, and the
Committee on Enforced Disappearances.62
These treaty bodies, including the Expert Committee of the CRPD, are
self-categorized as legal examiners.63 This legal label is partially what drives
the angst behind questions about how a treaty body’s interpretation of a
treaty would affect ratifying countries. The assertion that the bodies are legal
in nature is magnified by the fact that three treaties—the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and
the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances—unambiguously require
interpreting bodies to give consideration to the “usefulness of the
participation of some persons having legal experience.”64 In fact, nearly all
treaty bodies are comprised of a large number of members with a legal
background.65 Legal representation reinforces the idea that treaty bodies are
not mere guidance givers; their opinions may ultimately have some force.
Opposition to the CRPD is driven by concern that the Expert Committee
may exceed its stated boundaries and become a powerful monitoring body
that is capable of interfering with the lives and freedoms of the people of the
United States.66 These worries are not without support. When the actions of
other United Nations treaty monitoring bodies are examined, the results show

61

UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, Human Rights Bodies, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRigh
tsBodies.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
62
Id.
63
Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 905, 913 (2009) (discussing the role of treaty bodies in the interpretation of
human rights treaties).
64
Id. at 913.
65
Id. at 917.
66
BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16 (“Specifically, critics are concerned that
committee recommendations and decisions could supersede U.S. laws and presume authority
affecting the lives, freedoms, and decisions of private citizens.”).
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a modern trend towards bodies whose power exceeds their original
purpose.67
An inspection of other United Nations treaty bodies reveals that these
bodies have gone far beyond the confines laid out for them in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).68 The VCLT created the basics
of how a human rights treaty monitoring body should act.69 A body’s proper
role is to perform in accordance with these limited powers: monitor the
periodic reports of the States Parties, honor States Parties’ requests to send a
delegation during the consideration of their States Party’s periodic report,
issue summaries of States Parties’ compliance in treaty body annual reports,
and issue collective, non-binding, and non-critical comments, suggestions,
and recommendations on States Parties’ periodic reports.70
The bodies are to carry out these limited roles under the guideline of
using “good faith” to interpret the “ordinary meanings” of the treaties’
texts.71 On a most basic level, when these limited powers are mixed with the
necessity of using good faith, the outcome should be that all U.N. treaty
bodies are limited in scope. Despite that expected outcome, however, there
is a trend towards expansion of authority—the very concept that the
individuals against the ratification of the CRPD fear most.72
The first of the nine human rights treaty monitoring bodies was limited to
giving “general comments,” a term that was interpreted to mean simplified
and non-States Party specific.73 Any general comments given by the treaty
bodies were rare and not directed at any particular country, following the
lead of the Commission on Human Rights in monitoring periodic reports on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.74 This tradition soon began to
change in favor of sweeping observations and comments that targeted
specific ratifying nations.75 The modern general comment came about in the
early 1990s and does not mirror the cautious practices outlined by the VCLT
rules.76 “Most of the general comments read like a judicial opinion
interpreting a statute. They incorporate other treaties, conventions, and
67
Joanne Pedone & Andrew R. Kloster, New Proposals for Human Rights Treaty Body
Reform, 22 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 29, 48 (2012–2013).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 34.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 35.
72
Id. at 48.
73
Id. at 38–39.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 40–43.
76
Id. at 44–45.
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statements extraneous to the treaty, and their opinions often go far beyond
the text of the treaty.”77 In this view, the interpretations of human rights
bodies wield tremendous power, including potentially the power to
undermine the ratified treaty language.
There are three prominent examples of monitoring body overreach: the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)’s Committee; the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) Committee; and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD Committee), created by the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).78 These
examples exemplify why anti-CRPD ratifiers have concrete worries about
how the CRPD’s Expert Committee could potentially attempt to shape the
future of U.S. domestic law.
First, CEDAW is a United Nations treaty that is often described as an
international bill of rights for women.79 CEDAW aims to define what
constitutes discrimination against women, and it also establishes an agenda
for national actions designed to end discrimination against women.80
Articles 17–22 of CEDAW create the CEDAW Committee, a monitoring
body that reviews the States Parties’ periodic reports on compliance with the
treaty.81 The CEDAW Committee is only granted three powers: making
suggestions and general recommendations, inviting specialized agencies to
submit reports on the implementation of CEDAW, reporting annually to the
U.N. General Assembly on its activities.82
Importantly, the treaty does not authorize “concluding observations,” or
observations referring to a State Party-specific evaluation issued after the
evaluation of State Party periodic reports.83 These concluding observations
generally include criticisms of the States Parties’ implementation of the
treaty, in addition to steps that should be taken to remedy the concerns.84
Although these concluding observations are often used by U.N. human rights
77

Id. at 45.
Id. at 49–64.
79
U.N. Women: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Text of
Convention, U.N., http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm (last visited Sept.
7, 2014).
80
Id.
81
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, arts. 17–
22, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ce
daw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter CEDAW].
82
Id. arts. 21–22.
83
Id.
84
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 38.
78
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treaty monitoring bodies, there is no source of authority for such
observations based upon either the VCLT or the explicit contents of the
treaties.85
Despite a lack of unambiguous power, the CEDAW Committee has
disregarded the good faith limitations of the VCLT and has expanded the
treaty provisions to concepts that were not contemplated by the states.86 The
most prominent example of the CEDAW Committee overstepping its bounds
can be seen in the context of abortion.87 Human rights treaties have left
abortion matters up to States Parties, as finding any one solution to this
controversial topic has proven unmanageable.88
Accordingly, CEDAW’s text is absolutely silent on the topic of
abortion.89 However, in 1999, a full twenty years after the treaty was first
adopted, the CEDAW Committee stated that Article 12 of the CEDAW
treaty includes a right to abortion.90 Article 12 states:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care in
order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women,
access to health care services, including those related to family
planning.91
And from that ambiguous and broad language, the CEDAW Committee
derived a tangible rule: Article 12 encompasses a right to abortion.92 The
declaration of the right to abortion represented a new interpretation of Article
12—one that did not go without consequence.93 Soon after, the CEDAW
Committee began using concluding observations to impose the right upon
states,94 criticizing upwards of eighty nations for restricting abortions,
including a particularly strong reprimand towards Rwanda.95

85

Id. (“[T]he authority for issuing concluding observations is almost nonexistent. In fact,
this phrase does not appear in any of the treaties.”).
86
Id. at 50.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
CEDAW, supra note 81.
90
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 50–51.
91
CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 12.
92
See Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 50–51.
93
Id. at 52.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 52–53.
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This flexing of muscles by the CEDAW Committee may have come as a
result of pressure from lobbyist organizations, or it could have been a means
of self-promotion.96 Lobbyists, complete with enormous financial backing,
ran a conference in Glen Cove, New York with the aim of having a
“dialogue” with representatives of six major human rights treaty bodies. The
treaty bodies agreed to the dialogue in hopes of expanding their activities in
the field of women’s health, specifically targeting reproductive and sexual
health.97 Although the content of the dialogue is unknown, this strong
outside influence, combined with the CEDAW Committee’s self-promotion,
seems to reinforce the fears of some U.S. policymakers that are hesitant to
ratify the CRPD.
The autonomous nature of U.N. human rights treaty monitoring bodies is
not limited to the actions of the CEDAW Committee. The CERD Committee
also has a history of overexpansion.98 The first of the binding international
human rights treaties, CERD presented a unified condemnation of racial
discrimination, as all States Parties agreed to actively eradicate any such
discrimination.99 The CERD Committee has four basic functions, as laid out
by the treaty’s text: reviewing States Parties’ reports and requesting further
information from the States Parties as necessary; submitting an annual report
to the U.N. General Assembly on its activities, including any suggestions and
general recommendations based on the examination of States Parties’
reports; facilitating resolution of State Party complaints regarding other
States Parties alleged treaty violations; and considering communications
from individuals or groups claiming to be victims of treaty violations by the
State Party after explicit consent from the subject State Party.100 The
Committee, following modern trends towards an enlargement of power, has
not limited itself to the confines of the treaty’s substantive provisions.101
CERD’s Committee has issued unauthorized concluding observations and
has consistently shown a willingness to exert influence.102
96
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Most notably, the CERD Committee has redefined the critically important
term “racial discrimination.”103 Regardless of any positive effects an
evolving definition of “racial discrimination” may have, it is the States
Parties—not the Committee—that should be behind the alteration of the
concept.104 Contravening the good faith obligation within the VCLT, the
treaty body provided the stimulus for expanding “racial discrimination”
beyond its original focus on apartheid and legal segregation.105
The Committee Chairman has since admitted that without certain general
recommendations made by the Committee in the 1990s, states might not
have recognized the necessity of “pulling unintended de facto discrimination
and discrimination against indigenous people into the definition of racial
discrimination.”106 This overreach has not gone unnoticed; it is surely a
reason why the CRPD has encountered resistance in the United States
Senate.107
Finally, the last concrete example of U.N. treaty body overextension can
be seen within the CRC, which came into force in 1990 and recognizes a
number of rights possessed by children.108 The Committee on the Right of
the Child (CRC Committee or the Committee) was created to examine the
progress made by the States Parties in achieving the realization of the
obligations undertaken in the CRC.109 Notably, the CRC Committee has a
broader textual mandate than any other human rights treaty body.110
Unlike other monitoring bodies, the CRC Committee openly welcomes
advice from third-parties and has authorized direct communication with
individual States Parties.111 These powers are exemplified under three main
themes. First, third-party specialized U.N. agencies are “entitled to be
represented at the consideration of the implementation of such provisions of
the present Convention as fall within the scope of their mandate”—a feature
unique to the CRC.112 This feature allows the Committee to choose agencies
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to include within its discussions, magnifying how the Committee’s
foundation of knowledge is expanding.
The CRC treaty body mandate is also broader because it has a forwarding
power. When a state submits a five-year compliance report to the CRC
Committee, and the state subsequently indicates a necessity for either
technical assistance or advice from a third-party specialized U.N. agency, the
Committee is then approved to forward the report to the agency with any
comments the Committee has related to that particular request.113
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the CRC Committee mandate is
more expansive than any other human rights treaty in terms of direct contact
with States Parties. The CRC states that the Committee is sanctioned to
directly make “suggestions and general recommendations” to a State Party,
and is also authorized to transmit such reports straight to the State Party.114
However, this extensive textual foundation has not quelled the thirst of
the Committee.115 Although this is perhaps the least telling of the three
treaty body, even the CRC Committee has overstepped its bounds to a certain
degree.116 The Committee has issued general “comments” rather than
“recommendations,” it has held days of thematic discussion without any
supervision by the U.N. Secretary General, and it has issued concluding
observations in contravention of the VCLT.117
B. The Anti-Ratification Argument Relating Specifically to the CRPD
The above analysis of the breadth of the powers of the CEDAW, CERC
and CRD Committees exemplifies why some U.S. policymakers are
concerned over what ratification of the CRPD could mean in terms of U.S.
sovereignty. Human rights treaty enforcement bodies are far from inept
entities—for better or for worse, their actions have far-reaching impacts.
Those persons opposing ratification of the CRPD cite three specific
provisions that, in their opinion, invite the potential for trouble.118 These
provisions include: the lack of an explicit definition of “disability” within
113
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Article 1; parental authority questions derived from Article 7(2); and the
boundaries of reproductive health as presented in Article 25.119
First, the CRPD does not specifically define disability.120 Although
Article 1 does explain characteristics that would qualify a person to be
considered “disabled,” opponents of ratification cite the lack of a clearlydefined demarcation.121 The absence of a definition troubles opponents
because it leaves room for interpretation by the CRPD Expert Committee.
Further, certain U.S. Senators take the stance that if the ADA can contain a
functional definition of disability, then this revolutionary international
disability treaty should surely be capable of doing the same.122 In essence,
the lack of a definition raises red flags. The lack of a definition raises the
concern that the Committee will interpret “disability” in way contrary to U.S.
domestic law, potentially expanding the CRPD’s coverage to subject matters
not contemplated at ratification
Further, the text of Article 7 also creates concerns. Article 7(2) states: “In
all actions concerning children with disabilities, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.”123 Opponents of ratification are fearful
that this provision would empower the Disabilities Committee—not U.S.
parents or even U.S. domestic law—with the ability to make educational and
treatment-related choices for American children with disabilities.124 The
primary example of this manifestation of fear can be seen in homeschooling
advocates.125 Homeschooling promoters believe the Committee could
declare homeschooling to be inconsistent with the best interests of the child
under Article 7(2).126 This potential stripping of authority from American
parents, in light of the modern expansion of international treaty monitoring
bodies, is cause for uproar according to these advocates.127
Finally, Article 25 of the treaty is also a controversial portion of text. In
part, Article 25 requires states to:
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a. Provide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality
and standard of free or affordable health care and programmes
as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual
and reproductive health and population-based public health
programmes; [and] b. [P]rovide those health services needed by
persons with disabilities specifically because of their
disabilities, including early identification and intervention as
appropriate, and services designed to minimize and prevent
further disabilities, including among children and older
persons; . . .128
The main concern with Article 25 is that the term “sexual and reproductive
health” would be interpreted to include the right to an abortion.129 This
possibility is especially prominent because of the CEDAW Committee’s
prior interpretation of CEDAW Article 12.130 The United Nations has been
markedly reluctant to explicitly use the term abortion, making it likely that
Article 25 of the CRPD could be interpreted to cover abortion-related issues
despite the term never being used within the article’s text.131 As reflected in
the analysis of the committees of CEDAW, CRC, and CERD, this abortion
issue is not immaterial; international human rights committees have shown
they are willing to exceed the scope of their traditional enforcement body
powers.132 If the CRPD Disability Committee decides to attempt to enforce
abortion rights via Article 25 of the CRPD, there could be a strong impact
upon all States Parties, including the United States.
The final prong of the argument against ratification of the CRPD cites
already-enacted U.S. disability laws.133 The U.S. has already shown a
definitive commitment to the equal treatment of individuals with disabilities
through many existing laws and policies that promote equality, including the
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, the Americans Disabilities Act
128
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(ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA).134 Because strong policies regarding equality for
disabled persons already exist, opponents of ratification ask why the U.S.
should expose itself by ratifying a risky international treaty. For them, any
foreign policy benefits gained by ratification do not outweigh the
conceivable dangers.135 Below, these pre-existing protections are considered.
First, the U.S. Constitution provides for the equal protection of
individuals with disabilities.136 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in
part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.137
In practice, this Amendment, along with the Fifth Amendment, has meant
that when there is any governmental discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, a rational basis scrutiny test will be applied to that
discrimination.138 Further, the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution is also
pertinent. That Amendment bars the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”139 One example of this Amendment’s effect upon people with
disabilities is seen in the 1976 case Estelle v. Gamble.140 There, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a deliberate indifference to prisoners’ medical
needs, including any needs of disabled prisoners, equates to cruel and
These two
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.141
Amendments reinforce the idea that the U.S. has already taken sufficient
measures to protect against discrimination of the disabled, thus making
ratification of the CRPD superfluous.
The CRPD’s opponents also cite the domestic laws enacted by the United
States that aim to protect the disabled. The ADA, enacted in 1990, is an
influential bipartisan act that provides sweeping protections for individuals
134
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with disabilities.142 The ADA may already fulfill a majority of the
obligations imposed by the CRPD, including the responsibilities regarding
transportation, accessibility, employment, and equal participation in
government and private programs.143 Beyond the original provisions, the
coverage of the ADA was expanded in 2008 to include even more
protections for people with disabilities.144 The ADA provides expansive
safeguards for disabled individuals within the realms of employment, state
and local governments, and public accommodations.145
Further, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) exemplify a commitment to the equal
treatment of individuals with disabilities.146 The Rehabilitation Act mirrors
the ADA, but it operates in the context of federal entities and programs.147
IDEA calls for the education of children with disabilities by
authoriz[ing] federal funding for special education and related
services and, for states that accept these funds, it sets out
principles under which special education and related services
are to be provided. It requires that states and school districts
make available a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to
all children with disabilities, generally between the ages of
three and 21.148
By accentuating possible encroachments of international treaty power and
the United States strong domestic policy regarding disability law, the
aforementioned arguments illustrate why some policymakers are hesitant to
ratify the CRPD. Arguably, the “what-ifs” seem boundless and the United
States has already proven its commitment to equality.
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C. The Pro-Ratification Argument: A Different Spin on Treaty Monitoring
Bodies
In many ways, the argument for ratification of the CRPD is less abstract
than the argument against it and therefore more credible on its face. On the
most basic level, those who support ratification state that it is important for
the U.S. to finish what it started. As a leader in the implementation of the
CRPD and as an outspoken leader for disability rights, the U.S. should
adhere to the recommendations that it helped create. Under this view,
ratification would not require any drastic legal changes—the CRPD requires
States Parties to consider whether their existing domestic laws satisfy CRPD
requirements, or if any new measures are required for compliance.149 In light
of that requirement, the U.S. has already fulfilled most, if not all, of the
compliance standards via domestic laws such as the ADA.150 Because it
would not be tedious to comply, and because it would heighten the
credibility of U.S. foreign policy, ratification of the CRPD seems ideal.
Further, addressing the specific national sovereignty concerns of those
who oppose ratification, supporters of the CRPD fervently reiterate that the
treaty is non-binding as to international and domestic law.151 The U.S. has
long utilized declarations that emphasize that international human rights
treaties are non-self-executing.152 Self-executing treaties typically act in a
transnationalist fashion to “facilitate the domestic application of treaty-based
international norms.”153 Non-self-executing treaties, on the other hand, are
nationalist tools that serve to shield the domestic law of a nation against the
treaty’s legal norms.154 The reasoning behind why courts should hold that
non-self-executing treaties are not directly applicable by domestic courts is
outside the scope of this Note, but it is widely accepted within the American
system that non-self-executing treaties are not domestic law.155
Although doctrine concerning self-executing nature of treaties is
convoluted, one thing is clear: despite there being several human rights
treaties ratified by the U.S. with monitoring committees similar to CRPD,
there is “no instance where a U.S. federal court or the executive branch has
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construed a committee’s recommendations or decisions as having the force
of law.”156 The backdrop is muddled, but the derived rule is secure.
To further ensure that the CRPD would not directly affect domestic law,
supporters of ratification emphasize that submitting a domestic law reservation
to the CRPD would be an ultimate problem solver. The reservation would
essentially state that any U.S. obligations arising from the CRPD are restricted
to measures appropriate to the U.S. federal system, such as the implementation
of the ADA.157 Specifically, the federalism reservation proposed by the
Obama Administration reads:
This Convention shall be implemented by the Federal
Government of the United States of America to the extent that
it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local
governments; to the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the obligations of the
United States of America under the Convention are limited to
the Federal Government’s taking measures appropriate to the
Federal system, which may include enforcement action against
state and local actions that are inconsistent with the
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or other
Federal laws, with the ultimate objective of fully implementing
the Convention.158
If valid, this reservation would alleviate any national sovereignty concerns
related to the implementation of the CRPD. To determine the legitimacy of
such a reservation, however, it is important to understand what RUDs are
and why they are often utilized by parties to international human rights
treaties.
V. RUDS: A USEFUL TOOL
A. How RUDs Developed
Because both sides of the ratification debate have some valid concerns
and objectives, the ideal scenario would be to find a way to ratify the
document’s uncontroversial provisions while also finding a way to not
156
157
158
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adhere to the provisions with indeterminate meanings or effects. One way of
doing this is to use reservations, understandings, or declarations, commonly
referred to as RUDs.159 A “reservation” is a
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
State or an international organization when signing, ratifying,
formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession
to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of
the treaty in their application to that State or to that
international organization.160
This definition can be somewhat misleading due to the use of the term
“unilateral,” but the unilateral simply means that the reservation is asserted
independently, and thus has not been agreed upon by all of the negotiating
states.161
The U.S.’s history of submitting reservations to human rights treaties
dates back to the post-World War II era.162 After World War II, modern
human rights treaties began to combat atrocities against mankind and create
an organized regime designed to defend the human rights of all persons.163
These treaties represented a new era of change, but they also presented a vast
array of new challenges to United States policymakers and treaty-makers
alike.164 Human rights treaties’ provisions can both create tension between a
nation’s long-held beliefs/rights and produce concerns about the scope of the
treaty.165
When treaties cause tension between a nation’s domestic policy and
relevant treaty provisions, the issue of scope becomes fundamental. “Human
rights treaties touch on almost every aspect of domestic civil, political, and
159
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cultural life. In addition, the language of these treaties is often vague and
open-ended.”166 Because of such ambiguity, nations seek to affirmatively
define the parameters of any vague treaty that they intend to agree upon.167
Many times countries want to avoid the foreign policy complications of
failing to ratify a human rights treaty, while also managing to harmonize the
treaty with domestic law.168
The utilization of RUDs is as an effective way to solve both of the issues
presented above. RUDs can both balance policies and define scope; they
allow a nation to accept the attractive portions of a treaty while preserving
other portions for the control of domestic laws, and they also allow a nation
to formulate boundaries as to the treaty’s scope.169
RUD usage first became common practice for the U.S. in the 1970s.170
As globalization and international cooperation arose post-World War II, the
importance of treaties became substantial.171 The U.N. had fifty-one
Members in 1945, but by the end of 2006 membership had quickly reached
192.172 Also, from 1975 to 1995, the amount of multilateral treaties
skyrocketed.173
The world landscape had changed, as signified by the rush towards treaty
ratification, thus international strategies of cooperation changed as well.174
Despite the fact that reservations are presently used quite frequently,
questions remain about their validity in general and about their use in human
rights treaties.175 Many of these questions revolve around interpretations of
RUD limitations.176
B. The Limitations to RUDs
Some scholars doubt the legitimacy of a nation using RUDs in any treaty,
for any purpose.177 While some international law commentators think that
166
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RUDs are bad policy, others take the severe stance that RUDs are legally
invalid.178 The main arguments that support those assertions are succinctly
stated by Bradley and Goldsmith: “[R]eservations violate international law
restrictions on treaty conditions; that the non-self-execution declarations are
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; and that the
federalism understandings are inconsistent with the national government’s
responsibility, under both domestic and international law, for treaty
violations.”179
For purposes of a more complete analysis of the soundness of RUD
usage, however, it is best to assume that there will be no challenges to the
basic employment of a RUD. Nations have utilized reservations for several
decades now, and most arguments over RUDs now revolve around
interpreting the specific limitations under the VCLT.180 While nations can
object to the usage of any RUD for any reason, they would most likely be
ignored unless a large coalition formed. Most small protestations would take
the form of an objection to a reservation, a concept that will be discussed
later.181 More commonly, RUDs are challenged because they do not
conform to the basic rules of the VCLT.182 The VCLT makes it clear that
neither the right to use reservations nor the magnitude of reservation usage is
unconstrained.183
There are three main limitations to the ability to use a reservation.184 If
any of these limitations are implicated, the reservation is thereby
“prohibited.”185 First, the treaty may not explicitly prohibit the reservation.
Second, where the treaty provides that only specified reservations can be
made, any other reservations are prohibited. Finally, even if the first and
second limitations do not apply, the reservation cannot be incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty (this is referred to as the “Compatibility
Test”).186
The Compatibility Test is the most controversial and unclear of these
limitations.187 It is often difficult to measure whether a reservation to a
178
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human rights treaty meets the requirements of the Compatibility Test
because there are differing views as to how the test should be applied.188 The
International Court of Justice has openly recognized that states will have
mixed beliefs about the application of this test, yet the ICJ has failed to
clarify the appropriate interpretation.189
State objections to reservations due to Compatibility Test issues are rare,
although not unheard of.190 Further, when States do object, they often fail to
specify as to the legal ramifications of their objection.191 Article 20(4)(b) of
the VCLT states that if there is an objection made by another contracting
state to a reservation, that objection “does not preclude the entry into force of
the treaty as between the objecting and reserving states unless a contrary
intention is definitively expressed by the objecting State.”192 This reflects
that objections are both rare and, commonly, inconsequential.
One reason for the rarity of objections to the legality of a reservation
based upon the Compatibility Test is that there is a lack of clarity as to the
residual relationship is between the reserving state and the other States
Parties.193 The three possible legal effects are: (1) the reserving state remains
bound to the treaty except for the provision(s) to which the reservation
related; (2) the invalidity of a reservation nullifies the instrument of
ratification as a whole and thus the state is no longer a party to the
agreement; or (3) the invalid reservation can be severed from the instrument
of ratification such that the state remains bound to the treaty including the
provision(s) to which the reservation related.194
This complication is important to note because it allows some breathing
room for states wishing to submit reservations; the lack of clarity allows
states to be bold in their submission of reservations.
VI. CAN THE UNITED STATES SUCCESSFULLY SUBMIT A RUD TO THE
CRPD?
A history of the consequences of RUD usage reveals that the U.S. could
successfully submit a RUD to the CRPD without drastic results. Very few
RUDs blatantly fail the Compatibility Test, thus most reservations are
188
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“permitted” even if there is some concern that they are contrary to the object
and purpose of the treaty.195
A clear example of a reservation that fails the Compatibility Test can be
seen in Chile’s reservation to the 1984 Torture Convention.196 Centered
upon ending torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment, the Torture
Convention expressly precludes the defense of superior orders.197 Despite
that prohibition, Chile submitted a reservation that allowed a torturer to plead
Consequently, several states objected to Chile’s
the defense.198
reservation.199 The states opined that the reservation was incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Torture Convention, leading Chile to withdraw
the reservation.200 Chile’s reservation was in stark contrast to the object and
purpose of the Torture Convention; thus the reservation collapsed.
In most situations, however, there is more ambiguity as to how to handle
a RUD that is perhaps incompatible with a treaty. Even when some states
object to another state’s reservation, it is rare for the reservation to
definitively fail the Compatibility Test. This is exemplified best by an
examination of the U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR.201 The
U.S. reserved the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to “impose
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly
convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital
punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age.”202 Eleven European nations objected to this
reservation.203 The basis of those objections was that the U.S. reservation
amounted to a prohibited general derogation from the Covenant’s prohibition
on the execution of minors.204
These objections to the use of capital punishment were particularly
intriguing because many of the objecting states submitted their own
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reservations regarding other articles of the Covenant.205 The objections by
the other states were to different parts of the Covenant in which derogation
was not permitted, therefore drawing an interesting parallel between those
reservations and the U.S. reservation to a non-derogable article.206 As a
result of the objections to Article 6(5), the Human Rights Committee
expressed its informal view that a reservation to a non-derogable article
would not necessarily fail the Compatibility Test.207 Nevertheless, the
Committee did further state that the reservation would place a heavy burden
on reserving states to justify the reservation.208 Essentially, despite the
plentiful objections to the U.S. reservation, nothing resulted from them and it
was never clarified whether the reservation violated the Compatibility
Test.209 All states objecting to the U.S. reservation currently affirm that the
“objections shall not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the
Covenant between [the objecting state] and the United States of America.”210
Despite the controversy over the RUD, the ramifications have been far from
arduous.
Furthermore, objections to constitutional and domestic law reservations
have historically had the same inconsequential effects. The 1988 U.S.
reservation to the Genocide Convention demonstrates that constitutional
reservations are consistently accepted. The reservation stated: “[N]othing in
the Convention requires or authorises legislation or other action by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States
as interpreted by the United States.”211 The U.S. reservation elicited a
number of responses from European States, including six objections, but no
negative ramifications occurred.212 Sweden was the only nation to specify
the legal effect of such an objection,213 stating that “[I]ts objection does not
constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Convention between
Sweden and the United States.”214 This illustrates that although some states
are willing to take the initial step of objecting to a constitutional reservation,
it is unprecedented for such objections to create any true setbacks for the
reservation.
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In response to the increasing use of constitutional RUDs, the U.S. and the
U.K. have taken noteworthy stances on the topic.215 Because the U.S.
consistently utilizes constitutional reservations, one would expect for the
nation to regularly allow other states to submit them as well. This
assumption, though logical, has proven false.
The U.S. has been
unsympathetic towards other nations who utilize constitutional reservations,
as exemplified by the response to Colombia’s reservation to the Vienna
Drugs Convention of 1988.216 The U.S. was of the opinion that Colombia’s
reservation “purports to subordinate Colombia’s obligations under the
The U.S. objection reveals the
Convention to its Constitution.”217
complexity behind the current state of reservation use: states object to the
very same ideas that they later reserve, and a lack of concrete repercussions
for questionable reservations indicates that objections are mere vocalizations
of displeasure.
The U.S. is not alone in its complex response to and use of constitutional
RUDS. The U.K. has adopted a cautious and unrevealing stance to
constitutional reservations.218 Because constitutional reservations make it
extremely difficult to determine their effect on the reserving state’s
obligations, the U.K. has a history of simply asking the reserving state for
clarification rather than objecting to the reservations.219
Some nations have also utilized reservations designed to specifically
subordinate a human rights treaty to the domestic law of the nation. This
type of reservation, particularly when coupled with a constitutional
reservation, serves to protect against the very dangers expressed by those
who oppose ratification of the CRPD. The consequences of these
reservations, similar to the consequences of constitutional reservations, seem
minor. This can be seen via an examination of Iran’s reservation to the
Rights of the Child Convention 1989.220 Iran reserved the right “not to apply
any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with
Although other ratifiers sometimes consider such
Islamic laws.”221
reservations to undermine a commitment to the purpose of the treaty, other
215
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states rarely submit an objection with clear legal effects.222 A rare example
of objections that led to a partial withdrawal of domestic law reservations
occurred in 1995.223 Malaysia submitted a domestic law reservation to the
CEDAW Convention 1979 and then subsequently partially withdrew the
reservation following some objections.224
Because the U.S. has the ability to submit a RUD to the CRPD, it should
undoubtedly do so. A workable solution would be to attach a declaration
that the Convention is “not self-executing and a package of . . . RUDs
clarifying that the Convention does not impose any obligations on the United
States beyond those offered under existing state and federal laws, such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act.”225 Although submitting a RUD may seem
perilous, history has shown that such reservations, though not necessarily
welcomed by the international community, are not frowned upon to the
extent that other ratifying states will consistently refuse to enforce the treaty
between the reserver and the objector. While there are rare instances in
which a reservation will create such controversy that the reservation is
eventually withdrawn, that situation atypical. Many nations have utilized
constitutional or domestic law reservations in the past and will continue to do
so despite the multiple limitations of the Compatibility Test. In fact,
approximately thirty ratifying states have submitted some form of reservation
to the CRPD, indicating that a U.S. reservation will not disturb the treaty
itself.226
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Although it is likely that the CRPD will be viewed as not self-executing
and therefore have no drastic effect upon United States domestic law, there is
the possibility that a U.S. court could declare the CRPD’s provisions to be
the supreme law of the land, in which case the Disability Committee’s ability
to interpret the provisions could be substantial.
Because of that
improbable—yet logical—concern, it would be wise to utilize a RUD.
Ratifying the CRPD is an important objective for the U.S. From a foreign
policy perspective, ratification would commit the U.S. to further disability
equality, and allow the United States to influence in the subject’s future.
VII. CONCLUSION
A revolutionary global step towards equality for individuals with
disabilities, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
serves as a cornerstone of cooperation and initiative. The CRPD’s farreaching effects could have a significant impact upon the world. The U.S.
has been a pioneer of disability equality, enacting domestic legislation such
as the ADA and acting as a foreign policy leader in the quest for disability
rights.
Despite such commitments to the cause, U.S. ratification of the CRPD is
at the center of the debate. Those who oppose ratification cite sovereignty
concerns, while supporters firmly contend that the non-binding treaty is
needed to show an international commitment to disability rights. One way to
satisfy both sides is by use of reservations, understandings, or declarations.
By submitting a reservation to the CRPD, the U.S. would commit to the
treaty but avoid any concerns about how compliance with the treaty could
conflict with domestic laws or the U.S. Constitution.
Utilizing a constitutional or domestic law reservation is potentially
hazardous due to the ability of other ratifying states to object to the treaty
based on Compatibility Test concerns, but it is the most effective method of
appeasing both sides of the aisle. The odds of calamitous consequences
arising from a reservation to the CRPD are relatively slim, therefore it is in
the United States’ best interests to utilize this advantageous tool.

